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International humanitarian law applies different rules depending on
whether an armed conflict is international or internal in nature.
Commentators agree that the distinction is “arbitrary,”1 “undesirable,”2 “diffi-
cult to justify,”3 and that it “frustrates the humanitarian purpose of the law of
war in most of the instances in which war now occurs”. 4 The views are not
new. In 1948 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) pre-
sented a report recommending that the Geneva Conventions apply the full
extent of international humanitarian law “[i]n all cases of armed conflict
which are not of an international character, especially cases of civil war,
colonial conflicts, or wars of religion, which may occur in the territory of one
or more of the High Contracting Parties”.5 In 1971, it submitted a draft to a
Conference of Government Experts recommending a further proposition
that was intended to make the whole body of international humanitarian
law applicable to a civil war if foreign troops intervened.6 The ICRC put for-
ward a more subtle proposal along the same lines the following year.7 Finally,
in 1978 the Norwegian delegation of experts to the same Conference pro-
posed that the two categories of armed conflict be dropped in favour of a sin-
gle law for all kinds of armed conflict, again without success.8 Somewhat sur-
prisingly, calls for a unified body of international humanitarian law have
since died out, even though “the manifold expressions of dissatisfaction with
the dichotomy between international and internal armed conflicts”9 persist.
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This article revives the calls for a single law of armed conflict by illus-
trating the failure of the current regime to deal with conflicts that contain
both international and non-international elements, namely international-
ized armed conflicts. While the article does not attempt to comprehensively
plot the content of a single law applicable to all armed conflict, it does
sketch the outlines of a unified regime that might better account for the
intricacies of internationalized warfare. 
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1 R. J. Dupuy and A. Leonetti “La notion de conflict armé à caractère non international” in A. Cassese
(ed.), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Editoriale scientifica, Naples, 1971, p. 258. “Elle produit
une dichotomie arbitraire entre les conflits, puisque la distinction, purement formelle, ne se fonde pas sur
une observation objective de la réalité …”. See also G. Aldrich, “The laws of war on land”, American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 94, 2000, p. 62. “Reality can be messy, and armed conflicts in the real world do not
always fit neatly into the two categories – international and non-international – into which international
humanitarian law is divided.”
2 “It is difficult to lay down legitimate criteria to distinguish international wars and internal wars and it
must be undesirable to have discriminatory regulations of the Law of War for the two types of conflict.” 
I. Detter, The Law of War, Cambridge University Press, London, 2002, p. 49.
3 C. Warbrick and P. Rowe, “The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: The decision of the
Appeals Chamber on the interlocutory appeal on jurisdiction in the Tadic´ case”, International & Comparative
Law Quarterly, Vol. 45, 1996, p. 698.
4 “The ‘distinction’ between international wars and internal conflicts is no longer factually tenable or
compatible with the thrust of humanitarian law, as the contemporary law of armed conflict has come to be
known. One of the consequences of the nuclear stalemate is that most international conflict now takes the
guise of internal conflict, much of it conducted covertly or at a level of low intensity. Paying lip service to the
alleged distinction simply frustrates the humanitarian purpose of the law of war in most of the instances in
which war now occurs.” W. Michael Reisman and J. Silk, “Which law applies to the Afghan conflict?”,
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 82, 1988 p. 465.
5 J. Pictet (ed.), Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Vol. III: Geneva Convention
relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, ICRC, Geneva, 1960, p. 31 (hereinafter Commentaries). 
6 The paragraph reads: “When, in case of non-international armed conflict, one or the other party, or
both, benefits from the assistance of operational armed forces afforded by a third State, the parties to the
conflict shall apply the whole of the international humanitarian law applicable in international armed
conflicts.” International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the Work of the Conference of Government
Experts, Geneva, 1971, para. 284.
7 The proposal sought to apply the full body of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts when
third States intervened in support of both sides. See International Committee of the Red Cross, Report on the
Work of the Conference of Government Experts, Geneva, 1972, Vol. I, para. 2.332.
8 See Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Official Records, Summary Record, Vol. 5, p. 91 (CDDH/SR.10) (1978).
9 S. Boelaert-Suominen, “Grave breaches, universal jurisdiction and internal armed conflict: Is custom-
ary law moving towards a uniform enforcement mechanism for all armed conflicts?” Journal of Conflict and
Security Law, Vol. 5, No. 63, 2000, at section 5.
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The reality of internationalized armed conflict
The term “internationalized armed conflict” describes internal hostili-
ties that are rendered international. The factual circumstances that can
achieve that internationalization are numerous and often complex: the term
internationalized armed conflict includes war between two internal factions
both of which are backed by different States; direct hostilities between two
foreign States that militarily intervene in an internal armed conflict in sup-
port of opposing sides; and war involving a foreign intervention in support of
an insurgent group fighting against an established government.10 The most
transparent internationalized internal armed conflicts in recent history
include NATO’s intervention in the armed conflict between the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in
199911 and the intervention undertaken by Rwanda, Angola, Zimbabwe,
Uganda and others, in support of opposing sides of the internal armed con-
flict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) since August 1998.12
The proliferation of nuclear weaponry and its inhibiting impact on
direct forms of aggression during the Cold War led to many less transparent
internationalized armed conflicts, which although superficially internal were
in fact “wars by proxy”, taking place in the territory of a single State with the
covert intervention of foreign governments.13 The United States govern-
ment’s support of the contras in Nicaragua in the early 1980s is perhaps the
best documented example.14
Motivations for intervention in civil wars may have changed since the
end of the Cold War, but the increased economic interdependence of States
born of globalization, the development of nuclear capabilities among pre-
viously incapable states, the greater incidence of terrorism in Western 
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10 D. Schindler, “International humanitarian law and internationalized internal armed conflicts”,
International Review of the Red Cross, No. 230, 1982, p. 255.
11 S. Alexeyevich Egorov, “The Kosovo crisis and the law of armed conflicts”, International Review of the
Red Cross, No. 837, 2000, p.183.
12 “By 1999, a new war was raging in the renamed Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Rwandan and
Ugandan governments now supported the anti-Kabila opposition. Zimbabwe, Angola and other States backed
Kabila.” M. Shaw, “From the Rwandan genocide of 1994 to the Congo civil war”, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/
Users/hafa3/rwanda.htm>. See also Human Rights Watch, “Eastern Congo ravaged: Killing civilians and
silencing protest”, Vol. 12, No. 3(A), <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/drc/Drc005-01.htm#P68_1748>.
13 G. Abi-Saab, “Non-international armed conflicts”, in International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law,
Henry Dunant Institute / Unesco, Geneva, 1988, p. 222.
14 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14.
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countries and the increasing scarcity of natural resources all provide contin-
uing incentives for foreign intervention in domestic conflicts. As a reflection
of that reality, internal conflicts are presently more numerous, brutal and
damaging than their international counterparts,15 despite the fact that the
State remains the main war-waging machine.16 Consequently, international
humanitarian law still very much exists against a backdrop “d’une fusion des
éléments politiques internes et internationaux dont l’effet cumulatif est le
phénomène de conflit interne internationalisé: l’intervention d’Etats tiers
dans les guerres civiles est un fait constant.”17 There is almost invariably
some form of foreign state involvement in internal armed conflicts.18
The difficulty from a humanitarian perspective is that although inter-
nationalized armed conflicts have special features distinguishing them from
both international and internal armed conflicts,19 there is absolutely no basis
whatsoever for a halfway house between the law applicable in internal armed
conflicts and that relevant to international warfare.20 Therefore, the applica-
tion of international humanitarian law to internationalized armed conflicts
involves characterizing events as either wholly international or wholly non-
international according to the various tests espoused in the Geneva
Conventions, their Protocols and customary international law.
The legal dichotomy
Thresholds for the application of international humanitarian law
Traditionally, international humanitarian law has sought to regulate the
conduct of and damage caused by conflict between rather than within States.
The distinction was based on the premise that internal armed violence 
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15 B. De Schutter and C. Van De Wyngaert, “Non-international armed conflicts: The borderline between
national and international law”, Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 13, 1983, p. 279. 
16 Detter, op. cit. (note 2), p. 38. 
17 R. Bierzanek, “Quelques remarques sur l’applicabilité du droit international humanitaire des conflits
armés aux conflits internes internationalisés” in C. Swinarski (ed.), Studies and Essays on International
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet, ICRC, Geneva, 1984.
18 According to Detter “… most apparently ‘internal’ wars do, in fact, receive some kind of outside sup-
port.” Detter, op. cit. (note 2), p. 40. See also L. Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict, Cambridge
University Press, London, 2000, p. 46: “Even in the post-Cold War international order, outside involvement in
internal armed conflicts is still far from uncommon.”
19 H-P. Gasser, “Internationalized non-international armed conflicts: Case studies of Afghanistan,
Kampuchea, and Lebanon”, American University Law Review, Vol. 33, 1983, p. 157.
20 C. Byron, “Armed conflicts: International or non-international?”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law,
Vol. 6, No. 1, June 2001, p. 87.
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raises questions of sovereign governance and not international regulation.
On that basis, the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land applied solely to international warfare.21
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 continued to very heavily favour
regulation of inter-State rather than domestic warfare, the vast majority of
the substantive provisions contained in the Geneva Conventions of 1949
applying solely to:
“…all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also
apply to all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed
resistance.” 22
Although the scope of the article was more restrictive than some
would have hoped, the wording marked an important departure from earlier
conventions that had required more formalistic declarations of war.23 From
the perspective of internationalized armed conflicts, which are often charac-
terized by covert rather than direct military action, the change was critical. 
In addition, the international community’s experience of the Spanish
Civil War, which was in fact heavily internationalized,24 and the massive
atrocities committed against minority groups within individual nations dur-
ing the Second World War, contributed to a political willingness to at least
superficially regulate some aspects of civil war. After considerable disagree-
ment in giving that willingness form, Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949 extended the most rudimentary principles of humani-
tarian protection to those persons taking no active part in hostilities and
placed hors de combat.25 The problematic issue of defining internal armed
RICR Juin IRRC June 2003 Vol. 85 No 850 317
21 Aldrich, “The law of war on land”, op. cit. (note 1), p.54. 
22 Article 2 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949.
23 Reisman and Silk, op. cit. (note 4), p. 461.
24 K. D. Heath, “Could we have armed the Kosovo Liberation Army?  The new norms governing interven-
tion in civil war”, UCLA Journal of International Law & Foreign Affairs, Vol. 4, 2000, pp. 272 – 274.
25 The principles include prohibition of: “(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture; (b) taking of hostages; (c) outrages upon personal dignity, in parti-
cular humiliating and degrading treatment; (d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”. Common Article 3(2) also stipulates that “[t]he
wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for”.
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conflict was circumvented by a negative definition that rendered common
Article 3 applicable in “armed conflicts not of an international character,”
even if “one of the most assured things that might be said about the words
‘not of an international character’ is that no one can say with assurance pre-
cisely what they were intended to convey.”26 Although the substance of com-
mon Article 3 defines principles of the Conventions and stipulates certain
imperative rules, the article does not contain specific provisions.27 In addi-
tion, the scant principles enumerated in it apply only where the intensity of
hostilities reaches the level of “protracted armed violence between govern-
mental authorities and organised armed groups or between such armed
groups.”28
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions continued the
distinction between international and non-international armed conflicts
“leaving unresolved the troublesome question of the law to be applied to
armed conflicts in which there are both international and non-international
elements.”29 Additional Protocol I sought to reaffirm and develop the rules
affecting victims of international armed conflicts, specifically indicating in
Article 1 that “[t]his Protocol, which supplements the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949 for the protection of war victims, shall apply in the situa-
tions referred to in Article 2 common to those Conventions.”30 Tellingly in
relation to internationalized armed conflicts, Article 1(4) of Additional
Protocol I also explicitly provides that “…armed conflicts in which peoples
are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against
racist régimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination” automati-
cally qualify as international armed conflicts for the purposes of the Protocol.
Although the subject of some considerable criticism, the inclusion of such
conflicts within the scope of Article 1(4) confirms that the dichotomy
318 Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law
26 T. Farer, “The humanitarian laws of war in civil strife: Towards a definition of ‘international armed
conflict” Revue Belge du Droit International, 1971, p. 26 quoted in Moir, op. cit. (note 18), p. 46.
27 Commentaries, op. cit. (note 5), p. 48.
28 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, IT—94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 70 (hereinafter Tadic´ Jurisdiction Appeal). 
29 R. Baxter, “The duties of combatants and the conduct of hostilities (Law of the Hague)” in International
Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, Henry Dunant Institute / Unesco, 1988, p. 100.
30 The aspect of Common Article 2 that the section cross-references reads: “…all cases of declared war or
of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases of partial or total
occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no armed resis-
tance.”
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between international and non-international conflict is far from strict or
principled: international armed conflict is not a synonym for inter-State war-
fare, nor does the full extent of international humanitarian law presuppose
that the collective belligerents must be States.31
The more limited development of the law applicable in non-interna-
tional armed conflicts was continued by Additional Protocol II, which
sought to develop and supplement Article 3 common to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949.32 While providing greater clarity to the
broad principles identified in common Article 3, Additional Protocol II set a
significantly higher threshold for its own application, limiting its scope:
“to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (…) (Protocol I)
and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized
armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.” 33
Therefore, unlike common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,
Additional Protocol II will not apply to conflicts between two warring dissi-
dent groups. It will also only apply in conflicts that in fact approximate to
traditional conceptions of inter-State warfare, namely where an organized
dissident armed force exercises military control over a part of the territory of
a State Party.
In the context of internationalized armed conflicts, which by defini-
tion contain both international and internal elements, determining which
set of rules applies and to what aspect of the conflict is critically important.
The substantive legal differences
Superficially, the difference between the substantive regulation of
international armed conflicts and the laws applicable in non-international
armed conflicts is striking. As a reflection of the historical bias in interna-
tional humanitarian law towards the regulation of inter-State warfare, the
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31 Bierzanek, op. cit. (note 17), p. 284: “[L]e conflit international n’est pas synonyme de conflit interéta-
tique; de plus, le droit de la guerre ne présuppose pas, pour toutes ses règles, que les collectivités belligé-
rantes doivent être des Etats.”
32 Additional Protocol II, Art. 1.
33 Ibid.
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1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols contain close to 600 arti-
cles, of which only Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the 28 articles of Additional Protocol II apply to internal conflicts.34 In addi-
tion and as previously mentioned, the law of The Hague addressing methods
and means of combat and conduct of armies in the field is not applicable in
internal armed conflicts.35
Consequently, a strict reading of the Conventions and their Protocols
would suggest that a range of very significant disparities between the two
regimes exist. For example, common Article 3 covers only non-participants
and persons who have laid down their arms, and does little to regulate com-
bat or protect civilians against the effects of hostilities.36 Common Article 3
also fails to define elaborate rules of distinction between military and civilian
targets37 and makes no mention of the principle of proportionality in target
selection.38Although Additional Protocol II does address the protection of
civilian populations more explicitly,39 its coverage does not compare to the
prohibitions on indiscriminate attack,40 on methods and means of warfare
causing unnecessary suffering41 and on damage to the natural environment,42
that are applicable under Additional Protocol I. 
Most significant from a political perspective is the fact that there is no
requirement in either common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II that
affords combatants prisoner-of-war status in non-international armed con-
flicts, nor is there anything preventing parties from prosecuting enemy com-
batants in those circumstances for having taken up arms.43
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34 Boelaert-Suominen, op. cit. (note 9), footnote 31.
35 Ibid.
36 A. Cassese, “A tentative appraisal of the old and new humanitarian law of armed conflict”, in A Cassese
(ed.), The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Editoriale scientifica, Naples, 1971, pp. 492-493.
37 Article 48 of Additional Protocol I states that “[i]n order to ensure respect for and protection of the civi-
lian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civi-
lian population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall
direct their operations only against military objectives.”
38 Additional Protocol I, Articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(iii) and 85(3).
39 Additional Protocol II, Articles 13-15, relating to the protection of the civilian population, of objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population and of works and installations containing dangerous
forces.
40 Additional Protocol I, Art. 51.
41 Ibid., Art. 35(2)
42 Ibid., Art. 35(3).
43 In international armed conflicts, combatants have a “right to participate directly in hostilities.”
Additional Protocol I, Art. 43(2).
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More intricate anomalies are myriad even in instances of overlap
between the two systems. For example, while common Article 3 prevents a
combatant from being tortured, it does not prevent him or her from being
executed for treason.44 The uncomfortable overlap was also reinforced by the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC Statute), which
perpetuates the cumbersome international/non-international legal dichotomy.
The Statute limits the grave breaches regime to international conflicts45
and, despite similarities,46 the serious violations provisions of common
Article 3 that are applicable in “armed conflicts not of an international
character” are both different and less comprehensive than their interna-
tional counterparts.47
Yet somewhat ironically given the staunch opposition to explicitly
assimilating the laws of war applicable in internal and international armed
conflict, there is now extensive literature that suggests that customary
international law has developed to a point where the gap between the two
regimes is less marked.48 The Appeals Chamber of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Tadic´
Jurisdiction Appeal held that customary rules governing internal conflicts
include:
“protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate
attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property, 
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44 According to Farer, if an internal combatant’s punishment is limited to detention, the conditions and
form of detention may approach barbarity without manifestly violating common Article 3 and in spite of the
more complete protection that the Third Geneva Convention would offer prisoners-of-war in circumstances of
international equivalence. T. Farer, “Humanitarian law and armed conflicts: Towards the definition of ‘inter-
national armed conflict’”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 71, 1971, pp. 39-40.
45 ICC Statute, Art. 8(2)(b).
46 The ICTY has held that there is no material difference between the term “wilful killing” within the grave
breaches regime and common Article 3’s prohibition of “murder” and that “torture” is the same legal pheno-
menon in both types of conflict. Boelaert-Suominen, op. cit. (note 9), citing Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al., Case
No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, 16 Nov. 1998 (hereinafter “ Cˇelebic´i Judgement”), paras 421-23. Other provisions
in the ICC Statute, such as those dealing with inhuman treatment including biological experiments 
(Art. 8(2)(a)(ii)) and wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health (Art. 8(2)(a)(iii)), cor-
respond to provisions in it relating to violence to life and person (Art. 8(2)(c)(i)) and outrages upon personal
dignity (Art. 8(2)(c)(i)).
47 For a detailed comparison see H. Spieker, “The International Criminal Court and non-international
armed conflicts”, Leiden Journal of International Law, Vol. 13, 2000, p. 417.
48 Boelaert-Suominen, op. cit. (note 9); Byron, op. cit. (note 20); J-M. Henckaerts, “The conduct of hosti-
lities: Target selection, proportionality and precautionary measures under international humanitarian law”,
in The Netherlands Red Cross, Protecting Civilians in 21st-Century Warfare: Target Selection, Proportionality
and Precautionary Measures in Law and Practice, 8 December 2000, p. 11. 
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protection of all those who do not (or no longer) take active part in
hostilities, as well as prohibition of means of warfare proscribed in inter-
national armed conflicts and ban of certain methods of conducting hos-
tilities.”49
The then President of the ICTY, Antonio Cassese, opined that “there
has been a convergence of the two bodies on international law with the
result that internal strife is now governed to a large extent by the rules and
principles which had traditionally only applied to international con-
flicts…”50 Similarly minded and in contrast to the terms of the ICC Statute,
at least one ICTY Appeals Chamber Judge considered that “a growing prac-
tice and opinio juris, both of States and international organizations, has estab-
lished the principle of personal criminal responsibility for the acts figuring in
the grave breaches articles (…) even when they are committed in the course
of an internal armed conflict.”51 In fact, the ICRC has chosen to address
what it calls “the insufficiency with respect to content and coverage” of
treaty law applicable in non-international armed conflicts by analysis of cus-
tom and not promulgation of further treaty-based law.52 The position reflects
the reality that national legislation,53 international legal instruments54 and
judicial reasoning55 all show that “states are chipping away at the two-legged
edifice of the laws of armed conflict.”56
On the other hand, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY warns that
even though the chipping away process may have come some distance in
322 Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law
49 Tadic´ Jurisdiction Appeal, op. cit. (note 28), para. 127.
50 Memorandum of 22 March 1996 to the Preparatory Committee for the Establishment of the
International Criminal Court, in Moir, op. cit. (note 18), p. 51.
51 Tadic´ Jurisdiction Appeal, op. cit. (note 28), Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab.
52 Henckaerts, op. cit. (note 48), p. 11.
53 See (Belgium): Law of 16 June 1993 concerning repression of grave breaches (“infractions”) of the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and their Additional Protocols I and II of 8 June 1977; (Spain) Codigo
Penal, Law 10/1995, of 23 November; (Finland): Chapter 11 of the Revised Penal Code Dealing with War Crimes
and Crimes Against Humanity, 21 April 1995, Finnish Law Gazette 1995/587; (United States): Article 6 of the
United States War Crimes Act 1996; (Netherlands): The Dutch Law of War Crimes 1952; (Sweden): Chapter 22,
Section 11, of the Swedish Penal Code, National Council for Crime Prevention, Stockholm (1986); (Switzerland):
Code Pénal Militaire, Federal Law of 13 June 1927; (Nicaragua): Ley de Codigo penal de la Republica de
Nicaragua, Bibliografía Técnicas, (1997), all cited in Boelaert-Suominen, op. cit. (note 9), p. 4.3.1.
54 The Amended Protocol II of 1996 to the 1980 UN Weapons Convention, the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the
Prohibition of Anti-personnel Mines and the 1999 Second Hague Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict all apply equally to international and non-international armed conflicts.
55 See Boelaert-Suominen, op. cit. (note 9), section 4.3.2.
56 Ibid., section 5.
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eroding the disparity between the laws applicable in international and non-
international armed conflict, “this extension has not taken place in the
form of a full and mechanical transplant of those rules to internal conflicts;
rather, the general essence of those rules, and not the detailed regulation
they may contain, has become applicable to internal conflicts.”57
Consequently, the process has created what Meron describes as “a crazy
quilt of norms that would be applicable in the same conflict, depending on
whether it is characterized as international or non international.”58 Thus,
the struggle to determine the law applicable in armed conflicts that as a
matter of fact involve both international and internal elements, becomes a
complex but important task. 
The test for internationalization
In the Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY stip-
ulated that:
“It is indisputable that an armed conflict is international if it takes
place between two or more States. In addition, in case of an internal
armed conflict breaking out on the territory of a State, it may become
international (or, depending upon the circumstances, be international
in character alongside an internal armed conflict) if (i) another State
intervenes in that conflict through its troops, or alternatively if 
(ii) some of the participants in the internal armed conflict act on
behalf of that other State.”59
Agents of a State
The most frequently applied limb of the Tadic´ Appeal Judgement’s test
for determining whether an internal armed conflict has become interna-
tional is whether “some of the participants in the internal armed conflict
act on behalf of [an]other State.”60 The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
was asked to answer a similar question in the Military and Paramilitary
Activities in and against Nicaragua case in order to determine the responsi-
bility of the United States for armed conflict between the contras it had
RICR Juin IRRC June 2003 Vol. 85 No 850 323
57 Tadic´ Jurisdiction Appeal, op. cit. (note 28), para. 126.
58 T. Meron, “Classification of armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia: Nicaragua’s fallout”, American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 92, 1998 (hereinafter “Nicaragua’s fallout”), p. 238.
59 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, T-94-1-A, Judgement, 15 July 1999, para. 84  (hereafter Tadic´ Appeal Judgement).
60 Ibid.
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sponsored and the Nicaraguan government.61 In defining the circum-
stances in which an insurgent’s acts can be attributed to a State, the Court
applied what it described as an “effective control” test,62 which involved
assessing:
“whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States
Government was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on
the other that it would be right to equate the contras, for legal purposes,
with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting on behalf of
that Government.” 63
In applying that test to the facts, the ICJ found that despite a high
degree of participation and a general degree of control over the contras, who
were highly dependent on that foreign assistance, the United States was not
responsible for violations of humanitarian law perpetrated by the contras
since those violations “…could be committed by members of the contras
without the control of the United States.”64 
The substance of the decision and its relevance to international
humanitarian law have been the subject of considerable judicial inconsis-
tency and academic dispute, the intricacies of which are thoroughly set out
elsewhere.65 For the present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Tadic´
Appeal Judgement overruled the Trial Chamber’s support for the strict “effec-
tive control” test espoused in the Nicaragua case, declaring the ICJ’s reason-
ing “unconvincing […] based on the very logic of the entire system of inter-
national law on State responsibility.”66 As a result of the overruling, an
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61 Nicaragua case, op. cit. (note 14). The ICJ somewhat confusingly distinguished the question of whether
the acts of the contras were imputable to the United States from the question of whether the United States
had breached its international obligations to Nicaragua through its relationship with the contras. The Court
concluded that it “…does not consider that the assistance given by the United States to the contras warrants
the conclusion that these forces are subject to the United States to such an extent that any acts they have
committed are imputable to that State. It takes the view that the contras remain responsible for their acts,
and that the United States is not responsible for the acts of the contras, but for its own conduct vis-à-vis
Nicaragua, including conduct related to the acts of the contras” Nicaragua case, op. cit. (note 14), para. 116.
62 The Court stated that “for this conduct to give rise to a legal responsibility of the United States, it
would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary ope-
rations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.” Ibid., para. 115 (emphasis added).
63 Ibid., para. 109 (emphasis added).
64 Ibid., para. 115.
65 See Meron, “Nicaragua’s fallout”, op. cit. (note 58), Byron, op. cit. (note 20) and Moir, op. cit. (note 18),
pp. 46-52. 
66 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 59), para. 116.
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apparently less stringent67 and some suggest “dubious”68 test for determining
when parties can be considered to be acting on behalf of States has gained
ascendency in international criminal law.69 The test espouses three different
standards of control under which an entity could be considered a de facto
organ of a State, each differing according to the nature of the entity.70
Firstly, where the question involves the acts of a single private individ-
ual or a not militarily organized group that is alleged to have acted as a de
facto State organ, 
“it is necessary to ascertain whether specific instructions concerning the
commission of that particular act has been issued by that State to the
individual or group in question, or alternatively, it must be established
whether the unlawful act has been publicly endorsed or approved ex post
facto by the State at issue.”
In the second instance, involving control by a State over subordinate
armed forces, militias or paramilitary units, “control must be of an overall
character.” The Appeals Chamber declared that:
“… control by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or para-
military units may be of an overall character (and must comprise more
than the mere provision of financial assistance or military equipment or
training).” 71
The Appeals Chamber made clear that the overall control test under
the second category requires that a State “has a role in organising, coordinating
or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to financing,
training and equipping or providing operational support to that group” but
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67 The Appeals Chamber in Aleksovski declared that “[b]earing in mind that the Appeals Chamber in the
Tadic´ Judgement arrived at this test against the background of the “effective control” test set out by the deci-
sion of the ICJ in Nicaragua, and the “specific instructions” test used by the Trial Chamber in Tadic´, the
Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate to say that the standard established by the “overall control” test is
not as rigorous as those tests.” Prosecutor v. Aleksovski IT-95-14/1-A, Judgement, 24 March 2000 (hereinaf-
ter “Aleksovski Appeal Judgement”), para. 145.
68 Moir describes the overruling as “…an unnecessary (and indeed dubious) piece of reasoning.” Moir,
op. cit. (note 18), p. 49.
69 See Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 59); Aleksovski Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 67), 
paras 120-154; Prosecutor v. Delalic´ et al. IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001, paras 5-50 (hereinafter
“Cˇelebic´i Appeal Judgement”); Prosecutor v. Naletilic´ et al, IT-98-34-T, Judgement, 31 March 2003, paras 183-
188.
70 Cˇelebic´i Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 69), para. 13.
71 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 59), para.137.
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that it “does not go so far as to include the issuing of specific orders by the
State, or its direction of each individual operation.”72
The third and final test involves “assimilation of individuals to State
organs on account of their actual behaviour within the structure of a State.”73
The Appeals Chamber’s only explanation of the somewhat undeveloped cat-
egory consisted of three illustrations: an Austrian Jew elevated by German
camp administrators to positions of authority over the other internees;74 a
Dutch national who in fact behaved as a member of the German forces;75 and
the attribution of international responsibility to Iran for acts of five Iranian
“Revolutionary Guards” in “army type uniforms”.76
Despite the now extensive literature addressing the issue,77 application
of the three-pronged test remains complex, convoluted and the subject of
considerable confusion, even among Appeals Chamber Judges themselves.78
That complexity is plainly undesirable when, as Judge Shahabuddeen per-
suasively reiterates in the Blaskic´ Judgement, the degree of control required to
internationalize an armed conflict is simply that which “is effective in any
set of circumstances to enable the impugned state to use force against the
other state through the intermediary of the foreign military entity con-
cerned.”79 The question is, after all, whether the insurgent’s actions amount
to “a resort to armed force between States.”80
Moreover, if the complexity of the various tests has proved difficult
to apply in the context of criminal prosecutions where the full extent of
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76 Ibid., footnote 174.
77 See Meron, “Nicaragua’s fallout”, op. cit. (note 58), Byron, op. cit. (note 20); Moir, op. cit. (note 18), 
pp. 46 – 52; R. Hayden “Bosnia’s Internal War and the International Criminal Tribunal”, Fletcher Forum of
World Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1, 1998, p. 45;  R. Hayden, “Biased ‘Justice:’ Humanrightsism and the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia” , Cleveland State Law Review , Vol. 47, 1999, p. 566.
78 Judge Shahabuddeen claims “I am unclear about the need to challenge Nicaragua. I am not certain
whether it is being said that that much debated case does not show that there was an international armed
conflict in this case. I think it does, and that on this point it was both right and adequate.” Tadic´ Appeal
Judgement, op. cit. (note 59), Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, para. 17.
79 Prosecutor v Blaskic´, IT-95-14, Judgement, 3 March 2000 (hereinafter “The Blaskic´ Judgement”)
Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen.
80 An “armed conflict” is said to exist “whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or pro-
tracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such
groups within a State.” Prosecutor v Kunarac et al., IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement, 12 June 2002, para. 56 
(hereinafter “Kunarac Appeal Judgement”).
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hostilities can be viewed in hindsight,81 it must be debilitating for forces
involved in hostilities on the ground when the very purpose of interna-
tionalized armed conflicts is often to employ covert methods of warfare. In
those circumstances, relevant information is “the subject of fierce contro-
versy of a political nature”,82 giving rise to “opinions about the facts that
often differ widely.”83 The possibility that commanders of the Northern
Alliance in present-day Afghanistan could be expected to assess a test the
Appeals Chamber itself can hardly agree on, in the heat of battle, based on
highly protected intelligence and on an ongoing basis seems slim. Certainly,
“there is no reason to think that, during a conflict, one could convince a mili-
tary commander to respect certain rules by arguing that he is an agent of a for-
eign country.”84
The complexity also has serious effects on outside parties seeking to
enforce international humanitarian norms. Not only will parties to a con-
flict involving various international and domestic actors struggle to deter-
mine whether detainees qualify for prisoner-of-war status, so too will the
ICRC, which is attempting to encourage respect for that status.85 Moreover,
from the perspective of legality the test is a shaky foundation for the appli-
cation of the very different penal sanctions provided for under the two
regimes. It is hardly surprising, then, that the test has unduly delayed pro-
ceedings of both the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR).
In sum, the three-pronged test may well reflect the current state of
public international law on state responsibility, but its application to inter-
national humanitarian law undermines the possibility of a consistent or prin-
cipled application of humanitarian norms in internationalized warfare. As this
paper will show, that failing is unfortunately inevitable in a regime that
requires armed forces to artificially categorize internationalized armed conflict
RICR Juin IRRC June 2003 Vol. 85 No 850 327
81 Much of the evidence used by ICTY decisions to characterize the internal conflicts as internationalized
is “[a]n ex post facto confirmation of the fact…”. Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 59), para. 157.
82 Gasser, op. cit. (note 19), p. 157.
83 Ibid. For example, as Reisman and Silk point out, “the war in Afghanistan has never been either purely
internal or purely international. Any determination is further complicated by the lack of neutral accounts of
the conflict. Afghanistan is caught up in the politics of East-West rivalry, and most reports of the conflict there
rely, to a large degree, on sources with a clear preference for or tie to one side or the other in the larger
rivalry.” Reisman and Silk, op. cit. (note 4), p. 467. 
84 M. Sassòli and L. M. Olson, “International decision: Prosecutor v. Tadic´ (Judgement)”, American Journal
of International Law, Vol. 94, July 2000, p. 576.
85 Byron, op. cit. (note 20), p. 88.
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as wholly international or non international. The solution is thus to aban-
don the distinction rather than redefine the three-pronged test. 
Military intervention
The second criterion the Tadic´Appeals Judgement considered capable of
rendering an internal armed conflict international occurs where “another
State intervenes in that conflict through its troops.”86 In the Blas˘kic´
Judgement, the ICTY Trial Chamber seized on a range of factors in finding
“ample proof to characterize the conflict as international” based on
“Croatia’s direct intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina”.87 Although, like Tadic´,
the Chamber declined to articulate any particular standard for what degree of
intervention would be sufficient to internationalize a pre-existing internal armed
conflict, it was satisfied that that process had taken place by the presence of an
estimated 3,000 to 5,000 regular Croatian Army personnel who were mostly sta-
tioned outside the area of conflict between the the Croatian Defence Council
and the Bosnia Herzegovina Army.88 Although the Chamber accepted evidence
that the Croatian Army had had some presence in the area of conflict, the prin-
cipal rationale for its decision was that the Croatian Army’s hostilities: 
“in the areas outside the [conflict zone] inevitably also had an impact on
the conduct of the conflict in that zone. By engaging the [Bosnia
Herzegovina Army] in fighting outside the [conflict zone], the Croatian
Army weakened the ability of the [Bosnia Herzegovina Army] to fight the
[Croatian Defence Council] in central Bosnia.” 89
Consequently, the reasoning would seem to suggest that foreign military
intervention that only indirectly affects an independent internal conflict is suf-
ficient to render that conflict international. That supposition was subsequently
confirmed by the Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Judgement, which found that the Croatian
government’s intervention in the conflict against Serb forces in Bosnia interna-
tionalized a separate conflict in which the Croatian government had no direct
military involvement, namely the conflict between Bosnian Croats and
Bosnian Muslims.90 According to the Trial Chamber, it did this “by enabling the
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86 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 59), para. 84.
87 The Blas˘kic´ Judgement, op. cit. (note 79), paras. 75, 76 and 94.
88 The Trial Chamber went on to find that the Croatian Defence Council also acted as an agent of the
Croatian government, but the analysis of military intervention was independent of that finding.
89 The Blas˘kic´ Judgement, op. cit. (note 79), para. 94.
90 Prosecutor v. Kordic´ & Cˇerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, 26 February 2001.
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Bosnian Croats to deploy additional forces in their struggle against the Bosnian
Muslims.”91 The decision also uses a range of evidence to reach its conclusion,
but similarly fails to quantify the requisite extent of direct military force. The
Naletilic´ Judgement followed suit, stating unhelpfully that:
“There is no requirement to prove that [Army of the Republic of Croatia]
troops were present in every single area where crimes were allegedly committed.
On the contrary, the conflict between the [Armed Forces of the Government
of Bosnia and Herzegovina] and the [Croatian Defence Council] must be
looked upon as a whole and, if it is found to be international in character
through the participation of the [Army of the Republic of Croatia] troops, then
Article 2 of the Statute will apply to the entire territory of the conflict.”92
In fact, a Trial Chamber’s review of an indictment in Prosecutor v. Rajic´ is
the only instance where the question is specifically addressed.93 In that decision,
the Chamber found that an internal armed conflict could be rendered interna-
tional if troops intervene “significantly and continuously”.94 Unfortunately, sig-
nificant and continuous intervention is hardly a term of precision. Moreover,
the fact that the term is not mentioned in the Kordic´ & Cˇerkez, Blas˘kic´ or
Naletilic´ Judgements raises the question of whether more minor military inter-
vention could suffice. Certainly the Geneva Conventions apply in tradi-
tional inter-State armed conflicts “regardless of their level of intensity”.95
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91 Ibid., para. 108(2).
92 Prosecutor v. Naletilic´ et al, op. cit. (note 69), para. 194.
93 Prosecutor v. Rajic´, IT-95-12-R61, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61, 13 September 1996,
para. 12 “The Appeals Chamber’s decision on jurisdiction in the Tadic´ case did not, however, set out the quan-
tum of involvement by a third State that is needed to convert a domestic conflict into an international one.”
94 Ibid., para. 21 “There is therefore enough evidence to establish for the purpose of the present procee-
dings that, as a result of the significant and continuous military intervention of the Croatian Army in support
of the Bosnian Croats, the domestic conflict between the Bosnian Croats and their Government in central
Bosnia became an international armed conflict, and that this conflict was ongoing at the time of the attack on
Stupni Do in October 1993.”
95 See Baxter, op. cit. (note 29), p. 98: “The proper view would seem to be that ‘any other armed conflict
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties’ should be taken as referring to any out-
break of violence between the armed forces of two states, regardless of the geographical extent and intensity
of the force employed…”. Fenrick argues that “the firing of weapons by soldiers of opposing sides across a
contested border on the uninvited intervention of the armed forces of one State, even in small numbers, in
the territory of another State may trigger the application of the Geneva Conventions in totality.” M. Cottier, 
W. Fenrick, P. Viseur Sellers and A. Zimmermann, “Article 8, War Crimes”, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Observers Notes, Article by Article, Nomos, Baden-
Baden, 1999, p. 182, quoted in Byron, op. cit. (note 20), footnote 137. See also Commentaries, op. cit. 
(note 5): “It makes no difference how long the conflict lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.” 
04_article Stewart  22.7.2003  8:22  Page 329
There is no legal basis for treating internationalized armed conflicts any dif-
ferently.
Yet allowing foreign military intervention of any intensity to internation-
alize all armed conflicts within a territory sits uncomfortably with the Tadic´
Appeal Judgement’s initial statement on internationalized armed conflicts that
presupposed that an armed conflict may “…depending upon the circumstances,
be international in character alongside an internal armed conflict”. Regrettably,
the possibility of direct military intervention that only indirectly involves an
internal armed conflict as in the Blas˘kic´ and Kordic´ & Cˇerkez Judgements, and
the absence of any meaningful threshold test for what extent of direct mili-
tary intervention will internationalize a conflict, suggests the absence of a
principled basis for distinguishing internationalized armed conflicts from
those “international in character alongside an internal armed conflict”. 
One explanation may be that only “direct military intervention which
has the effect of supporting a campaign is enough to internationalize the con-
flict”.96 But as a matter of logic it is questionable whether a military interven-
tion that does not involve insurgents acting on the intervening State’s behalf
could make that insurgent group qualify as “[m]embers of other militias and
members of other volunteer corps, including those of organized resistance
movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory…”,97 with the result that it becomes meaningful to speak of
“resort to armed force between States”.98 An intervening State’s unintentional
support of third parties does not make those parties its agents and if insurgents
do not belong to a State for the purposes of the Geneva Conventions, their
actions cannot constitute an international armed conflict.99
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96 R. Cryer, “The fine art of friendship: Jus in bello in Afghanistan”, Journal of Conflict and Security Law,
Vol. 7, 2002, p. 42.
97 Third Geneva Convention, Art. 4(2) (emphasis added). 
98 Common Art. 2 of the Geneva Conventions; See also Kunarac Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 80),
para.56. 
99 See for example Judge Shahabuddeen’s declaration in the Blas´kic´ Judgement where he states that
“There is an armed conflict between a secessionist group and the government of the state. A foreign state
intervenes militarily in support of the secessionist group and is resisted by the local state. The external mili-
tary intervention clearly constitutes an armed conflict between states for the purpose of making the Fourth
Geneva Convention applicable. But does the internal conflict itself become an armed conflict between states?
The answer is in the affirmative if the foreign state assumes control over the secessionist group such that the
use of force by the secessionist group becomes a use of force by the foreign state against the local state,
thereby giving rise to an armed conflict between states within the meaning of Article 2, first paragraph, of the
Fourth Geneva Convention.” The Blas˘kic´ Judgement, op. cit. (note 79), Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen.
04_article Stewart  22.7.2003  8:22  Page 330
Even where support is an intentional consequence of intervention, the
notion that mere support could internationalize an otherwise internal armed
conflict would seem to contradict the “overall control” test for agency, which
explicitly states that “it is not sufficient for the group to be financially or
even militarily assisted by a State.”100 The argument that direct military inter-
vention should be treated differently because it completely changes the
course of the conflict101 is also unconvincing, since provision of arms, finan-
cial aid and intelligence have similar effects despite being explicitly excluded
by the same “overall control” test.
The more pertinent rationale for incorporating military intervention as a
criterion for the internationalization of armed conflicts might be that for the
purposes of the second paragraph of Article 2 common to the Geneva
Conventions, such intervention qualifies as a partial occupation. That para-
graph was “intended to fill the gap left by paragraph 1”102 by stipulating that the
entire Conventions “shall also apply to all cases of partial or total occupation
of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets
with no armed resistance.”103 Even so, the application of the paragraph to for-
eign military intervention in civil conflicts poses several problems.
It is clear that the passage was adopted in order to extend the applica-
tion of obligations of Occupying Powers under the Fourth Geneva
Convention to protected persons in instances of occupation such as that
which occurred when the German Reich invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939,
where the latter simply capitulated without putting up armed resistance.104
The paragraph’s ability to internationalize a pre-existing and independent
internal conflict is less clear, perhaps reflected by the absence of any refer-
ence to the provision in the Blas˘kic´, Kordic´ & Cˇerkez or Naletilic´ Judgements.
Moreover, while it is laudable to bring as much as possible of the humanitar-
ian law applicable to international armed conflicts into operation, military
presence need not amount to occupation and has no bearing on whether the
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100 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 59), para. 130 (emphasis added).
101 Aldrich, “The laws of war on land”, op. cit. (note 1), p. 63. See also F. Kalshoven, The Law of Warfare: A
Summary of its Recent History and Trends in Development, A.W. Sijthoff, Leiden, 1973, p. 15: “it seems justi-
fied for the purposes of the present subject to attribute the aforesaid internationalizing effect to intervention
taking the form of direct and significant participation of foreign armed forces, as that will incontestably
deprive the armed conflict of its original character as a purely intestine affair.”
102 Commentaries, op. cit. (note 5), p. 22.
103 1949 Geneva Conventions, common Art. 2 .
104 Baxter, op. cit. (note 29), p. 95. See also Commentaries, op. cit. (note 5), p. 8.
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conduct of insurgents qualifies as the use of armed force by one State against
another. Allowing foreign military presence to internationalize all conflict
within a territory is also inconsistent with the notion that an international
armed conflict can exist “alongside an internal armed conflict,” and directly
contradicts the State Parties’ rejection of the clause that would have allowed
for the automatic application of the full body of international humanitarian
law when a third State militarily intervenes.105 In fact, the major concern
behind the rejection of the suggested amendment based on direct military
intervention was that it would create a massive incentive for insurgents to
seek assistance from sympathetic foreign States, thereby rapidly escalating
internal hostilities.106 That concern persists in the jurisprudence identified.
Predictably, the lack of clarity in determining the circumstances in
which military intervention will suffice to render an internal conflict inter-
national raises serious practical difficulties. For instance, the alleged partici-
pation of several senior Ugandan military personnel in the Rwandan
Patriotic Front’s war with the Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) between
1990 and 1994,107 may have constituted “another State interven[ing] in that
conflict through its troops.”108 That participation might have been sufficient
to internationalize the conflict, contrary to the ICTR’s findings that “it is a
matter of common knowledge that the conflict in Rwanda was of an internal
non-international character.”109 Yet even if the FAR could somehow deter-
mine the overall degree and significance of Ugandan military participation,
it seems highly unlikely that it would re-question “common knowledge” in
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105 See note 7.
106 D. Schindler, “The different types of armed conflicts according to the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols”, Recueil des Cours, Vol. II, 1979, p. 150.
107 “On 1 October 1990, the Ugandan army invaded Rwanda under the disguise of an internal rebellion by
the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) led by the Rwandan-born Ugandan General Fred Rwigema. At that time,
General Paul Kagame was pursuing military studies in USA as an Ugandan military officer; in fact, he was the
Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence in the Ugandan government’s army (…). When Gen. Fred Rwigema died in
the end of October 1990, Major Paul Kagame returned to Uganda and took charge of the RPF.”  Rally for the
Return of Refugees and Democracy in Rwanda, “No Arms Nor Impunity For Suspected Rwandan War Criminals
On Power,” Press Release No. 4/2001 < http://www2.minorisa.es/inshuti/rdr26.htm> See also S. R. Shalom,
“The Rwandan Genocide” <http://www.zmag.org/ZMag/articles/april96shalom.htm> “In October 1990, the
Rwandan Patriotic Front, an organization of primarily Tutsi refugees from Uganda, invaded the country to
obtain the right to return to Rwanda and to overthrow the dictatorial Habyarimana regime. Many of the RPF
soldiers were veterans of civil war in Uganda, where they had fought for a non-ethnically based regime, some
rising to high positions in the Ugandan military.”  
108 Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 59), para.84.
109 Prosecutor v. Ntagerura et al, ICTR-99-46-T, 4 July 2002, “Oral Decision”, p. 9.
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light of that information, to bind itself to a more rigorous body of humani-
tarian law on the basis of legal standards that lack any real clarity. 
In sum, the inclusion of direct foreign military intervention qua foreign
military intervention in the test for an internationalized armed conflict is at
best confusing and at worst fundamentally incoherent. In either case, the
implications for the principled observance of humanitarian norms are bleak. 
The effect of internationalization
Even after an aspect of the test for internationalization is satisfied, the
effect of that internationalization on other conflicts within the same terri-
tory and the extent to which international humanitarian law continues to
apply after the end of international participation remain unclear.
“Global” versus “mixed” characterization
The position adopted by the ICTY relative to violence in the former
Yugoslavia is that it can be characterized “at different times and places as
either internal or international armed conflicts, or as a mixed internal-
international conflict.”110 The predominance of that “mixed” approach is
reflected in the inclusion of the phrase “depending upon the circumstances,
[the conflict may] be international in character alongside an internal armed
conflict” in the Tadic´ Appeal Judgement’s original test for internationalization
of internal conflict.111 The rationale for the “mixed” approach is apparently
that an act of internationalization only renders international the conflict
between the parties belonging to States rather than all conflicts in the territory.112
While the position is clearly justified on a strict reading of the Conventions,
it is equally clear that it often involves artificially differentiating internal
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110 “Taken together, the agreements reached between the various parties to the conflict(s) in the former
Yugoslavia bear out the proposition that, when the Security Council adopted the Statute of the International
Tribunal in 1993, it did so with reference to situations that the parties themselves considered at different
times and places as either internal or international armed conflicts, or as a mixed internal-international
conflict.” Tadic´ Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 59), para. 73. 
111 See above note 59.
112 Greenwood also defends the “mixed” approach based on the danger of prejuding the status of the
conflict given the marked difference between the criminal law applicable in the two circumstances; the appa-
rent intention of the Security Council that both types of conflict occurred in the former Yugoslavia and the com-
plexity of the conflicts in the area. C. Greenwood “International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case”,
European Journal of International Law, Vol. 7, No. 2, 1996, available at: <http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol7/No2/
art8-01.html#TopOfPage>.
04_article Stewart  22.7.2003  8:22  Page 333
aspects of armed conflicts from international, a process that has proved
impractical, convoluted and imprecise. As McDonald observes: 
“[w]ith the increase in the number of internal and internationalized armed
conflicts is coming greater recognition that a strict division of conflicts into
internal and international is scarcely possible, if it ever was…”.113  
In response, a number of authorities have preferred to apply the full
body of international humanitarian law to an entire territory that contains
multiple conflicts of international and internal origin. For instance, in the
case of the former Yugoslavia, proponents of this “global view” of characteri-
sation considered “… the situation to be an international armed conflict,
arguing that to divide it into isolated segments to exclude the application of
the rules of international armed conflict would be artificial.”114 The global
view has considerable support: Judges Li115 and Rodrigues,116 the Nikolic´ and
Mladic´ Decisions,117 the United Nations Commission of Experts,118 the United
States government119 and several academic scholars120 have advocated or
adopted a blanket classification of State territories containing international
and internal armed conflicts. Even the normally reticent ICRC urged parties
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113 A. McDonald, “The year in review”, Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Vol. 1, 1998, p. 121.
114 Meron, “Nicaragua’s fallout”, op. cit. (note 58), p. 238.
115 Tadic´ Jurisdiction Appeal, op. cit. (note 28), Separate Opinion of Judge Li on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, paras. 17-18: “I am of the opinion that the submission of the
Prosecution to view the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in its entirety and to consider it international in
character is correct.”
116 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No IT-95-14/1, Judgement, 25 June 1999, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Rodrigues, Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber, paras. 19 and 22: “[I]nternational humanitarian law applies
throughout the territory in which an international conflict takes place (…) and for the entire duration of the
hostilities, insofar as the conflict must be viewed as a whole” and  “I support a global approach to the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia.” 
117 Byron, op. cit. (note 20), p. 68.
118 “[T]he Commission is of the opinion that the character and complexity of the armed conflicts concer-
ned, combined with the web of agreements on humanitarian law that the parties have concluded among
themselves, justifies the Commission’s approach in applying the law applicable in international armed
conflicts to the entirety of the armed conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.” Final Report of the
Commission of Experts S/1994/67, 4-27 May 1994, section II.A.
119 Prosecutor v. Tadic´, IT-94-1-T, “Amicus Curiae Brief presented by the Government of the United
States”, 25 July 1995, cited in Meron, “Nicaragua’s fallout”, op. cit. (note 58), pp. 26-34, footnote 15.
120 Meron, “Nicaragua’s fallout”, op. cit. (note 58), p. 238. See also G. H. Aldrich, “Comment: Jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 90,
1996, p. 68: “In my view, this first decision by the appeals chamber is unfortunate in that it complicates unne-
cessarily the further work of the Tribunal by suggesting that each prosecution will have to involve arguments
and decisions as to the characterization of the armed conflict in which the alleged offenses occurred…”.
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to the Vietnam War in 1965 to observe the full body of international humani-
tarian law throughout the territory, on the basis of the same reasoning.121
Although the global view is positive from a practical and humanitarian
perspective, it is contradicted by the international community’s rejection of the
ICRC’s attempt to adopt an explicit provision in Additional Protocol I making
the whole body of international humanitarian law applicable to a civil war if
foreign troops intervened122 and by what is now the orthodox reference to
“mixed” international and non-international armed conflicts in the jurispru-
dence of the ICTY.123 The global approach would also seem to lead to the con-
clusion that a single international use of force in a foreign territory, direct or
otherwise, would somehow suffice to render all internal armed conflict in that
territory international irrespective of whether internal conflicts constitute a
“resort to force between States” within the terms of the Geneva Conventions.
The tension between the two approaches to characterization is not
likely to be easily resolved. As Meron laments:
“the contradictory decisions rendered by the different ICTY chambers on
the nature of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia illustrate the difficulty of
characterizing ‘mixed’ or ‘internationalized’ conflicts. There is no agreed-
upon mechanism for definitively characterizing situations of violence.”124
Worse, the relative strengths and weaknesses of the “mixed” and
“global” views indicate that reaching any sort of agreement within the pres-
ent framework will inevitably involve choosing between a theory that can-
not work and a practice that is not justified. The challenge, therefore, is not
so much to the merit of the two competing views as to the structure of inter-
national humanitarian law more generally. 
Close of internationalized hostilities
Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention defines the point at which
the law applicable in international armed conflicts ceases to apply. The arti-
cle stipulates that “[i]n the territory of Parties to the conflict, the application
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of the present Convention shall cease on the general close of military opera-
tions.”125 The Commentaries on the Geneva Conventions afford the term
“general close of military operations” a broad interpretation, indicating that
it is equivalent to the point at which “the last shot has been fired,”126 and “in
most cases (…) the final end of all fighting between all those concerned.”127
Thus, in States that contain several warring factions of both international and
internal origin, the Commentaries at least superficially suggest that interna-
tional humanitarian law continues to apply until the end of all hostilities,
domestic or otherwise. The competing view is that the term “close of military
operations” implies only international military operations, allowing ongoing
hostilities “not of an international character” to continue or recommence
under the auspices of the law applicable to non-international armed conflict. 
Somewhat ambiguously, the ICTY Appeals Chamber in the Tadic´
Jurisdiction Appeal addressed the issue by declaring that:
“International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed
conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general con-
clusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful
settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian
law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the
case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party,
whether or not actual combat takes place there.” 128
While the statement is often cited to give international humanitarian
law its widest possible application, it is far from clear that it represents an
authority for the notion that the law applicable in international armed con-
flicts continues to apply to surviving internal conflict. The more plausible
interpretation is that the Chamber’s comments only contemplate ongoing
obligations between warring parties inter se, in accordance with the more
restrictive view of “close of military operations.” That interpretation is sup-
ported by the same decision’s creation of the “mixed” approach to characteri-
zation on the very basis that international and non-international armed con-
flicts can mutate and co-exist. The interpretation is also supported by the fact
that both the Cˇelebic´i and Tadic´ Trial Judgements found that prior to the 
Yugoslav People’s Army’s formal withdrawal on 19 May 1992, the relevant 
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conflict was international in character, but that subsequently the Bosnian Serbs
were not agents of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that the conflict was
therefore internal.129 The former judgement emphatically declared that:
“It is evident that there was no general cessation of hostilities in Bosnia
and Herzegovina until the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in
November 1995. The Trial Chamber must, however, address the possibil-
ity that the nature of the armed conflict was changed by the withdrawal
of the external forces involved, and hence the cessation of those hostili-
ties, and the commencement of a distinct, self-contained, internal con-
flict between the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and organised
armed groups within that State.” 130
Although the conclusions that the status of the conflict were both
overturned on appeal because of factual findings concerning agency, in both
cases the Appeals Chamber tacitly endorsed the notion that an international
armed conflict can become internal131 Moreover, the possibility of transition
from international to internal armed conflict is not a mere function of inter-
national criminal prosecution: formal foreign recognition of the People’s
Republic of Kampuchea in 1980 sufficed to render an internationalized con-
flict internal despite ongoing hostilities in the territory.132
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The precedents’ apparently more restrictive interpretation of “close
of military operations” has clear appeal. Extending the application of inter-
national humanitarian law beyond the close of international hostilities to
the end of even internal conflict could foreseeably involve applying the
full body of international humanitarian law in circumstances falling below
the threshold required for the application of even common Article 3, and
could continue to do so several years after the end of international partici-
pation.133 In addition, the wider interpretation would make it near impossi-
ble to distinguish the initiation of distinct internal conflicts from those
that represent a continuation of international hostilities, since there are no
means of determining how closely linked in time, territory, membership or
motivation a preceding international armed conflict and subsequent civil
war must be to justify the continued application of the more comprehen-
sive body of law. In fact, the application of the law applicable in interna-
tional armed conflicts in instances where the tests for internationalization
are no longer met would undermine the tests themselves. In such
instances, the “overall control” test would not involve “assessing all the
elements of control taken as a whole,”134 but rather determining whether
forces were ever under the overall control of a foreign State. If Sassòli and
Olson are correct in suggesting that “there is no reason to think that, dur-
ing a conflict, one could convince a military commander to respect certain
rules by arguing that he is an agent of a foreign country”,135 the chances of
doing so several years later, on the basis that his group used to be an agent
of a foreign State, are almost none. The more intellectually satisfying solu-
tion, apparently adopted by the ICTY in Tadic´ and Cˇelebic´i, is thus that the
full body of international humanitarian law ceases to apply at the close of
international hostilities. The only difficulty is that identifying the point at
which international hostilities cease is impractical in many international-
ized armed conflicts. 
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Traditionally, the close of inter-State conflict requires the cessation of
hostilities evidenced by armistice agreement and the subsequent establish-
ment of peace, generally by the signing of a formal peace treaty.136 Because
internationalized conflict is rarely initiated by declaration and frequently
involves covert rather than direct hostilities, formal events such as armistice,
conclusion of treaties and public withdrawal of forces are rare. As Detter
observes, “there is no need to acknowledge the end of something which
allegedly never existed.”137 Therefore, the refrain that international humani-
tarian law “extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclu-
sion of peace”138 is often unhelpful in the context of internationalized armed
conflicts since the latter is seldom formally achieved. Consequently, in many
instances the close of internationalized military operations can only be
determined by simple reference to the point at which actual hostilities cease
on the ground.139
In practice, a clear decision about that point “may be difficult to make
and subject to much controversy, especially when an armed conflict involves
several or a multitude of States and when military operations close at differ-
ent times within different regions involved in the conflict.”140 It is even more
problematic when international conflict is carried out through domestic
intermediaries on the basis of a relationship that “fluctuates greatly in its
intensity, with periods of armed hostilities interspersed with perhaps lengthy
periods in which no hostilities occur…”.141 The near Herculean challenge in
internationalized conflict is thus to distinguish the actual close of hostilities
from their mere suspension.142 
For example, in applying the tests for internationalization to present-
day hostilities in Afghanistan, Cryer cites a range of factors which in his
estimation render a finding that the Northern Alliance is under the overall
control of the Coalition forces “not totally perverse,”143 but goes on to 
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conclude on balance that such control does not exist, predominantly
because “the Northern Alliance was acting directly contrary to the clearly
expressed wishes of the Coalition when it actually took the Afghan capital
Kabul, and entered the city itself.”144 The assumption is, therefore, that the
group was under the overall control of the Coalition prior to its taking of
Kabul but not afterwards.
Accepting that hypothesis and on the basis that “close of military oper-
ations” relates only to international operations, the Northern Alliance’s
entry into Kabul terminated the relationship of overall control with
Coalition Forces, potentially ending actual international hostilities and thus,
at least on the orthodox “mixed” conflict approach, giving birth to an inde-
pendent non-international armed conflict between the Northern Alliance
and the Taliban. Subsequently, the Northern Alliance was bound by the law
applicable in international armed conflict prior to its entry into Kabul but
only by common Article 3 thereafter.145
That an insurgent force could avoid obligations contained in the full
body of international humanitarian law simply by disagreeing with a foreign
State is highly undesirable, to say nothing of the unrealistic obligations
required of that force if its entry into Kabul is deemed a close of international
hostilities.146 The anomaly is particularly apparent in the context of a contin-
uing internal armed conflict with the Taliban and the possibility that
Northern Alliance and Coalition forces might collude on subsequent mili-
tary operations. The overriding concern, aside from the possibility that the
Northern Alliance could quite reasonably consider itself alternating between
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145 Only by common Art. 3, since Afghanistan has not signed Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions.
146 Under Art. 118 of the Third Geneva Convention, captured enemy combatants must be repatriated at the
close of hostilities. Art. 17 of the First Geneva Convention requires States Parties to exchange lists showing
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internal and internationalized armed conflicts depending on its “overall”
relationship with Coalition forces, is that it could justify any characteriza-
tion it preferred.
On the other hand, the wider interpretation of “close of military oper-
ations” would allow the Coalition’s relationship with the Northern Alliance
to internationalize the armed conflict between the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance until the close of all hostilities in Afghanistan, rendering the
Northern Alliance’s entry into Kabul irrelevant to the characterization of
the conflict, contradicting Cryer’s conclusion and promoting insurgent
appeals for foreign intervention, a situation drafters of the Geneva
Conventions clearly sought to avoid. Moreover, if previous experience in
Afghanistan is any indicator, the more liberal view might continue the
application of law applicable in international armed conflict to hostilities in
some way linked to the present internationalized conflict decades after the
end of Coalition participation. 
In an apparent attempt to resolve this type of impasse, the Trial
Chamber in the Cˇelebic´i Judgement creatively reasoned that: 
“the relevant norms of international humanitarian law apply throughout
its territory until the general cessation of hostilities, unless it can be
shown that the conflicts in some areas were separate internal conflicts
unrelated to the larger international armed conflict.”147
The difficulty is that purporting to exclude “separate internal conflicts”
that are “unrelated” begs the question of how to distinguish international
and internal hostilities, which is the very essence of the complication.
Furthermore, the presumption that all armed conflict in a specific territory is
international was described by the Appeals Chamber as “unfortunate,”148 pre-
sumably because the notion was unprecedented and cuts across the tests for
internationalization. 
The unavoidable conclusion is that the ambiguities in determining the
close of internationalized hostilities, coupled with the opposing views about
the possibility of mixed armed conflicts, suggest the absence of any coherent
basis for determining the temporal or territorial scope of humanitarian law in
territories containing conflicts of both international and internal origin. Much
of that failing again stems from the uncomfortable relationship between the
standards applicable in international and non-international armed conflict. 
RICR Juin IRRC June 2003 Vol. 85 No 850 341
147 Cˇelebic´i Judgement, op. cit. (note 46). para. 209.
148 Cˇelebic´i Appeal Judgement, op. cit. (note 69), p. 46.
04_article Stewart  22.7.2003  8:22  Page 341
Political influence on characterization
The legal and political ramifications of one State’s use of force against
another create real incentives for States intervening in foreign civil unrest to
deny that involvement. Similarly, States and non-state actors have proved
equally willing to favour or fabricate accounts of foreign participation in
internal conflicts for their own wider political gain. As a result, the charac-
terization of armed conflicts involving international and internal elements,
and the applicable law that flows from that characterization, are frequently
“the subject of fierce controversy of a political nature.”149
A prime example of that controversy occurs where an aggressive for-
eign State deposes an established government and installs a puppet leader to
“invite” military intervention to suppress a pre-existing civil war. The chal-
lenge in determining the applicable law involves distinguishing between
legitimate inter-governmental military assistance and covert means of
obscuring the existence of a hostile invasion of a State by foreign forces.150
That tension was demonstrated par excellence by the Soviet military inter-
vention in Afghanistan in 1979, which, for the Soviets, was initiated on the
basis of an invitation issued by the then newly appointed Prime Minister
Babrak Karmal pursuant to a Soviet/Afghan treaty of co-operation.151 The
Soviets thus maintained that their presence in Afghanistan constituted
bilateral relations between two countries linked by a treaty of friendship to
fight an internal uprising152 and that there was consequently no armed con-
flict between State Parties to the Conventions, nor a forced military occupa-
tion. Conversely, foreign sources considered that the Soviet forces had been
implicated in assassinating Karmal’s immediate predecessor, installing
Karmal, an Afghani who had no official position in the government only
days prior to their full military intervention, and issuing his alleged invita-
tion by radio broadcast from within Soviet Central Asia.153 If those assertions
are true, characterizing a foreign State’s military invasion of another as either
a non-international armed conflict or no conflict at all certainly circumvents
the function of the laws of war.154 The well-founded concern is that in order
to avoid internationalizing civil wars, any State could: 
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“maintain a stable of political would-bes and has-beens of varying
national pedigrees then at the appropriate time, one with the right
nationality would be saddled and bridled and brought to the ring to issue
the necessary ‘invitation’.” 155
Not only does the Afghan experience highlight the difficulty with deter-
mining whether invitations are legitimately issued; it demonstrates the fre-
quent disagreement in the characterization of conflicts, particularly between
parties to the conflict. As Gasser observes in relation to the same events:
“Given these different positions, it would be unrealistic to expect the
three parties to the conflict to reach the same view of the legal aspects of
the dispute. Furthermore, it is unlikely that they would agree to observe
the complete set of rules of international humanitarian law and, thus,
implicitly to recognize the international nature of the conflict.”156
The problem is equally pronounced in relation to internal aspects of
internationalized armed conflicts, which involve fundamental inequalities
between the “legitimate” State acting in self-defence and the “criminal”
insurgents.157 Consequently, States involved will seek to deny the very exis-
tence of insurgent forces or the possibility that such forces have entitlements
or liabilities,158 thereby affecting the humanitarian law applicable between
State and internationalized insurgent and, perhaps more importantly, the
law protecting civilians in such circumstances. On that very basis, the Soviet
and Afghan governments involved in hostilities in 1979 argued that the sit-
uation was not subject to the laws of armed conflict at all because the inter-
nal disturbance that the Soviet forces were invited to address did not consti-
tute protracted armed conflict.159 Similarly, during the Yemen conflict of
1962-70, political motivations led royalists to characterize the violence in
two contradictory ways, claiming that the conflict was international in rela-
tion to Egyptian forces but internal in relation to the rebels.160
The views of outside observers as to the characterization of interna-
tionalized armed conflicts may also differ, giving rise to difficulties in foreign
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States observing their obligation “to respect and ensure respect for the
Conventions in all circumstances.”161 During the Korean War, for example,
the Soviet Union claimed there was an internal war since only one legiti-
mate government was involved in hostilities, whereas Western powers advo-
cated the application of the full law of international armed conflict.162
Under these circumstances, and in the absence of an impartial body
charged with authoritatively determining the status of armed conflicts, it is
fair to assume that parties will characterize conflicts in terms that best suit
their own interests. The sheer complexity of attempting to artificially char-
acterize internationalized armed conflict as either wholly international or
non-international promotes that latitude. Therefore, while a single defini-
tion of armed conflict within the confines of a uniform body of humanitarian
law would not prevent disagreements of fact, hostile covert takeovers or
internationalized armed conflicts, it would prevent political agendas from so
negatively affecting humanitarian principles applicable in those contexts.
Recommendation
“…we would appear to be moving tentatively towards the position
whereby the legal distinction between international and non-interna-
tional armed conflict is becoming outmoded. What will matter as regards
legal regulation will not be whether an armed conflict is international or
internal, but simply whether an armed conflict exists per se.”163
Commentators are unanimous in their disrespect for the strict
dichotomy between international and non-international armed conflict, but
few have attempted to tackle the concerns underpinning the political unwill-
ingness to adopt a single law of armed conflict applicable in all situations.
Traditionally, those concerns have been based on a fear of premature recogni-
tion of belligerence, the potential for promoting internal uprisings, a real reluc-
tance to be prevented from dealing with individuals participating in such
groups under domestic law and, in some instances, an uneasiness about apply-
ing the full body of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts. 
The development of customary international law assimilating many of
the rules applicable in internal and international armed conflict has come
some way in dispelling uneasiness about applying international principles in
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civil warfare. Yet as has been shown, that process has “not taken place in the
form of a full and mechanical transplant,” resulting in “a crazy quilt of norms”
applicable in instances of armed conflict. If anything, the promulgation of a
single law of war applicable in all armed conflicts would thus present an
opportunity to coherently codify and reconcile the rapid development of cus-
tomary law applicable in internal conflicts. There is no doubt that that
process requires a great deal more careful thought since “much of the Geneva
Conventions simply cannot be applied in civil conflicts because their opera-
tion turns on notions of belligerent occupation of territory and enemy nation-
ality, concepts that are alien to civil conflicts.”164 Nevertheless, those difficul-
ties already arise in internationalized non-international armed conflicts.
A particular sticking point in developing a single law of armed conflict
is defining a generic definition of the term in light of the different levels of
intensity that trigger international and non-international armed conflicts at
present. Specifically, a single definition of armed conflict will need to ensure
that States continue to enjoy an ability to deal with internal disturbances
under domestic law but that international conflicts of low intensity remain
subject to international humanitarian protection. One possible solution is to
adapt the approach proposed by the Brazilian government’s experts in rela-
tion to the application of Additional Protocol II, which defined armed con-
flict as conflict between “organized armed forces or other organized armed
groups under a responsible and identifiable authority, and clearly distin-
guished from the civilian population…”.165 The requirement that armed
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forces must be distinguished from the civilian population would provide a
basic protection of a State’s ability to deal with internal tensions under
domestic law since those conflicts normally involve asymmetrical guerrilla
warfare from within civilian populations as a result of the insurgents’ military
inferiority, limited weaponry, and lack of significant control over territory.166
The Conference of Government Experts also felt that the requirement that
armed forces be under responsible authority “implies that such armed forces
are subject to a system of internal discipline which enables them to respect
all or some of the law of armed conflicts.”167 All these factors are likely to
exclude internal disturbances, riots and terrorist activities from the scope of
a single body of international humanitarian law while still including low
level conflict between international forces. The definition could be made
more restrictive by adopting further criteria that might include an element of
territorial control akin to Art. 1 of Additional Protocol II,168 an intensity
threshold similar to that adopted by the ICC Statute,169 or a combination of
thresholds triggering the same body of law. In addition, by dispensing with
references to statehood, a definition could also apply international humani-
tarian law in conflicts that are trans-national in character170 and in instances
involving the disintegration of states and the establishment of new ones.171
This approach could also allow all combatants in armed conflicts to be
entitled to prisoner-of-war status, while preserving the State’s ability to
maintain law and order during internal disturbances and tensions such as
riots or isolated and sporadic acts of violence. While it is essential not to be
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when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or
between such groups.” 
170 According to Münkler, “[t]he term civil war is the symmetrical opposite of the term international war;
the asymmetrical antonym is transnational war, i.e. one in which the boundaries drawn by the States no lon-
ger play a role. This type of war crosses national borders without being waged as a war between States, such
as the wars in and around Angola, Zaire/Congo, Somalia and Afghanistan.” H. Münkler “The wars of the 21st
century”, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85, No. 849, March 2003 p. 16.
171 Meron, “Humanization of Humanitarian Law”, op. cit. (note 124), p. 257.
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politically naïve with regard to the very real concerns that governments cite
against extending prisoner-of-war status to internal conflict or according
combatants in such conflicts immunity for taking up arms,172 there is very lit-
tle other incentive for insurgent groups to comply with the laws of war if they
are not able to claim those privileges.173 Moreover, granting the privileges 
to insurgents might promote greater reciprocity on their part, particularly
when they hold a significant number of State prisoners.174 The adoption of 
Art. 4A(2) of the Third Geneva Convention would also require a certain
number of criteria to be met for entitlement to prisoner-of-war status,175
meaning that granting that status to parties engaged in internal armed con-
flicts will not necessarily impede the prosecution of all individuals for taking
up arms, even within the context of hostilities that constitute armed con-
flict.176 Furthermore, even prisoners of war can be prosecuted for aggression,
crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, further countering the
concern that affording such individuals prisoner-of-war status in internal
armed conflicts will promote unmitigated internal revolt. Therefore, although
the question warrants considerably more debate, amplification of prisoner-of-
war status within the context of a single law of armed conflict would ensure a
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172 “In international armed conflicts, prisoner-of-war status flows from the so-called combatants’ privi-
lege, which simply means that the members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict enjoy immunity for
their warlike acts. In other words, the combatants’ privilege is a license to kill, maim, or kidnap enemy com-
batants, destroy military objectives, and even cause unavoidable collateral civilian casualties. My govern-
ment, as you know, presides over a new and unstable state. It is plagued with ideological and ethnic rivalries,
aided and abetted by external states bent on destabilizing our infant democracy. Do you really think that we
would concur in any treaty that would grant immunity from our treason laws to our domestic enemies, and by
doing so grant them a license to attack the government’s security personnel and property, subject only to
honourable internment as prisoners of war for the duration of the conflict?” W. Solf, “Problems with the appli-
cation of norms governing interstate armed conflict to non-international armed conflict”, Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law, Vol. 13, 1983, pp. 291-292.
173 Ibid., p. 292.
174 Ibid., p. 293.
175 See Art. 4(A) of the Third Geneva Convention, in particular Art. 4(A)(2), which requires that individuals
must be members of a militia that answers to a responsible command, has a fixed and distinctive sign, carries
arms openly and conducts its operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war.
176 Article 25 of the ICRC’s draft Additional Protocol II extended prisoner-of-war provisions to combatants
in non-international armed conflicts on this very basis. That article reads: “Members of regular armed forces
and members of those armed forces which have fulfilled the conditions stipulated in Article 4 A (2) of the
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, shall receive, after
having fallen into the power of the adversary, a treatment similar to that provided for prisoners of war in the
said Convention.” Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva 3 May – 3 June 1972, Commentary, Vol II, p. 49.
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consistent respect for that status in internationalized conflicts, even when
the circumstances of those conflicts are complex and dynamic.
Likewise, a single body of international humanitarian law applicable in
all contexts would allay the concern that allowing foreign intervention to
internationalize internal conflicts creates an incentive for insurgent groups
to invite that intervention, thereby rapidly escalating hostilities. Any such
incentive is based solely on the perceived incongruity between the law appli-
cable in international and internal armed conflict, an incongruity that
would be eliminated by a single definition of armed conflict incorporating
both international and non-international elements. Similarly, the political
reluctance to be candid about military interventions in foreign civil wars
would not have such a heavy impact on the humanitarian laws applicable in
such contexts if a single body of law applied regardless of whether a State
acknowledged involvement.
Finally, it is clear that a major reservation in the development of inter-
national humanitarian law relating to internal armed conflicts has been the
question of the recognition of belligerency. That recognition elevates a rebel
movement to the status of a State and demands that other States remain
neutral between the warring parties. Even though the doctrine has not been
exercised since the American Civil War, giving rise to very reasonable claims
that it no longer exists in international law,177 the fear that application of the
Geneva Conventions might lead to belligerent recognition is a matter of
extreme political sensitivity.178 Consequently, a single body of international
humanitarian law would, like the ICC Statute and the Geneva
Conventions, incorporate articles to reaffirm that the application of laws of
war to internal armed conflicts “shall not affect the legal status of the Parties
to the conflict.”179 In addition, because a single law of armed conflict could
dispense with references to statehood altogether and potentially involve very
348 Towards a single definition of armed conflict in international humanitarian law
177 According to Doswald-Beck “[r]ecognition of belligerency has not, however, been given since the
American Civil War and there must thus be serious doubts whether the notion has not fallen into desuetude.
Textbooks regularly repeat this doctrine as part of the law, but the real test is whether States seriously view
it as a legal reality in modern times, and its total non-use, although not conclusive evidence, must neverthe-
less be carefully assessed.” L. Doswald-Beck, “The legal validity of military intervention by invitation of the
government”, British Yearbook of International Law, 1985, p. 197.
178 McCoubrey and White, op. cit. (note 158), p. 61.
179 Common Art. 3(3). Art. 8(3) of the ICC Statute provides that “Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall
affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend
the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate means.”
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different thresholds than those relevant to determinations of belligerency,
the change would hopefully improve the distinction between the doctrine
and humanitarian protection, thereby prompting greater observance of
international humanitarian law. 
Conclusion
“If international law, while of course duly safeguarding the legitimate
interests of States, must gradually turn to the protection of human beings,
it is only natural that the aforementioned dichotomy should gradually
lose its weight.”180
The divergent standards applicable within the Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols have failed to adequately address the now
prolific incidence of internationalized armed conflict. The law developed to
bridge the distance between the instruments has created convoluted tests
for agency of a State that in practice are near impossible to apply.
Jurisprudence betrays an equally ambiguous and impractical test for direct
military intervention sufficient to internationalize an otherwise internal
conflict. Even once internationalized, it is difficult to determine the law
applicable to internal armed conflicts as relationships and military pres-
ences change. Moreover, the international/non-international dichotomy in
international humanitarian law has proved susceptible to incredible politi-
cal manipulation, particularly when conflicts involve international and
internal elements. 
Further consideration of substantive aspects of a single law of armed
conflict will therefore be essential in the development of greater humani-
tarian protection during internationalized armed conflict. This will
inevitably require greater attempts at addressing the political concerns that
were operative in the creation of the international/non-international
dichotomy. Although overcoming those concerns may seem politically
ambitious, it is important to maintain an historical perspective on the
growth and development of international humanitarian law.181 That history
is ample proof that with critique, consideration and concern, the incon-
ceivable can rapidly become reality.
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180 Tadic´ Jurisdiction Appeal, op. cit. (note 28), para. 97.
181 De Schutter and Van De Wyngaert, op. cit. (note 15), p. 290.
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Résumé
Vers une définition unique des conflits armés dans le droit 
international humanitaire :
une critique des conflits armés internationalisés
James G. Stewart
La stricte division du droit international humanitaire en règles applicables
dans le cadre de conflits armés internationaux et règles applicables aux conflits qui
ne sont pas de caractère international est presque universellement critiquée. Des
tentatives ont été faites, lors de la négociation des Conventions de Genève et de
leurs Protocoles, d’abandonner cette distinction, mais les appels à la création d’un
ensemble unique de règles de droit international humanitaire ont, depuis, sombré
dans l’oubli. Cet article ravive ces appels en mettant en évidence les insuffisances
du traitement dichotomique actuel des conflits armés internationalisés, c’est-à-dire
les conflits armés présentant, tout à la fois, les caractéristiques d’un conflit interne
et d’un conflit international. 
L’article conclut que le droit élaboré pour définir cette «internationalisation»
a institué des tests complexes qui, dans la pratique, sont quasiment irréalisables. Et
même lorsqu’un conflit est internationalisé, il est difficile de déterminer quel droit
est applicable, car les relations et les présences militaires changent. En outre, la
dichotomie «international/non international» du droit humanitaire peut faire l’objet
d’incroyables manipulations politiques, souvent au détriment de la protection
humanitaire. Il est essentiel d’étudier plus en profondeur les aspects concrets d’un
droit des conflits armés unique pour assurer une protection humanitaire accrue en
cas de conflit armé internationalisé.
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